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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1.'' Does the Subpoena Powers Act violate the due pro-
cess clause of the Utah Constitution by granting to prosecutors 
the unbridled power to subpoena witnesses and conduct secret 
interrogations without establishing any standards to protect 
against abuse? 
2. Does the Subpoena Powers Act, by creating an 
investigative procedure with all of the powers of the grand 
jury and none of the protections, violate individual constitu-
tional rights, including the right to be warned against 
incriminating oneself, the right to be advised of the nature 
and scope of the investigation and the right to be informed 
that counsel may be present during questioning?* 
3. Does the Subpoena Powers Act, by granting 
unbridled discretion to the prosecutor to conduct grand jury 
type proceedings in secret, violate the constitutional require-
ment that there be a separation of powers among the branches of 
government? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The constitutional and statutory provisions relied on 
by respondent Emery Mining Corporation are set forth in Appen-
dix "A" hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is taken from a final Order of the Seventh 
Judicial District Court of Emery County dismissing a criminal 
investigation and declaring unconstitutional the Subpoena 
Powers Act, Utah Code Ann, S 77-22-1 et. seq. (1982) (sometimes 
referred to hereinafter as the •Act" or the "Subpoena Powers 
Act".). (R. at 734) (A copy of Judge Boyd Bunnell's decision 
is attached hereto as Appendix "B".) The district court's 
decision came in response to respondents1 constitutional chal-
lenges to the Subpoena Powers Act and the actions of the Attor-
ney General under authority of that Act, 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
During its 1980 Budget Session, the Utah State Legis-
lature re-codified Utah's criminal procedure statutes. As part 
of that re-codification, the Legislature amended the Subpoena 
Powers Act so as to virtually eliminate judicial control over a 
prosecutor's use of the courts' subpoena power. (Tr. of Legis-
lative Debates, H.B. No. 32, Jan. 19, 1980 at pp. 5-6). (R. at 
318). Under the amended Act, a prosecutor need no longer pre-
sent a court with good cause for the issuance of each subpoena. 
Rather, a single good cause showing, if approved by the court, 
entitles a prosecutor to conduct an investigation during which 
he may issue subpoenas and take testimony in secret, both with-
out judicial supervision. 
On January 26, 1983, the Utah Attorney General's 
Office initiated such an investigation upon approval of the 
Seventh District Court for Emery County. (R. at 8). The court 
also granted the Attorney General's request that the investiga-
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tion be subject to a secrecy order. (R. at 3). The investiga-
tion was authorized on the basis of an affidavit submitted by 
Wayne I*. Wickizer, an investigator for the Attorney General's 
Office. The affidavit, consisting primarily of hearsay allega-
tions, asserted that UP&L and Emery Mining officials had 
engaged in misconduct during the period from September 14, 1981 
through March 19, 1982. (R. at 5) (Due to a continuting 
secrecy Order, a copy of the affidavit is not attached hereto, 
but appears separately as Appendix "C"). 
The Attorney General's Office began issuing subpoenas 
in the name of the Seventh District Court to various individ-
uals, including non-targeted third parties. (Appellant's Brief 
at pp. 5-6). Because of the secrecy order and the Attorney 
General's refusal to identify those served, it is still unknown 
exactly to whom and for what purpose most of the subpoenas were 
served. (R. at 745). Each of the respondents to this appeal 
was served with a subpoena and subsequently challenged the 
enforceability thereof. (R. at 9, 62-135, 212, 220-232, 
255-339, 607, 633-651). 
Emery Mining, one of several respondents herein, is a 
closely held corporation which operates UP&L's coal mining 
properties as an independent contractor. The subpoena duces 
tecum served on Emery Mining, dated May 16, 1984, was directed 
to the "custodian of records" and commanded production of: 
records which identify all officers, direc-
tors, consultants and employees (both union 
and non-union, professional and mining) of 
-3-
Emery Mining for the period 1979 to the 
present. Such shall include, but not be 
limited to, names, addresses, telephone num-
bers, dates of employment and employee num-
bers, if known. 
(A copy of the subpoena is attached as Appendix "D".) The sub-
poena specifically stated that it was issued by order of the 
district court and that failure to obey the subpoena would 
result in punishment for contempt of court. (R. at 651-52). 
Emery Mining requested, but never received, information about 
the nature of the investigation and whether its officers or 
owners were targets of the investigation. (R. at 640). 
Respondents UP&L, Maxfield, Stott and Colby were the 
first to challenge to Attorney General's subpoenas through 
motions to quash. (R. at 57, 62). During a hearing on the 
motions held on May 30, 1984, the Seventh District Court voiced 
concern about the constitutionality of the Act, particularly 
with respect to the Act's lack of procedural safeguards. (Tr. 
of Hearing May 30, 1984 at pp. 43-44, 68). Notwithstanding 
those reservations, the district court denied the motions to 
quash, but imposed conditions on the prosecutors use of the 
subpoena power. These conditions required that subpoenaed 
individuals be warned whether they were targets of an 
investigation, informed of their right to counsel and advised 
of the nature and scope of the investigation. Ij3. 
Shortly thereafter, respondents UP&L, Maxfield, Colby 
and Stott filed motions to reconsider. (R. at 255). At about 
this time, respondents Fletcher, Thompson, Ziemski and Conklin, 
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who had already been charged criminally, filed motions seeking 
access to certain information developed during the investiga-
tion, and joined the motions to reconsider* (R. at 383-86)• 
In response to this second attack on the Act's consti-
tutionality, the Attorney General1s Office withdrew all out-
standing subpoenas with the exception of the yet unchallenged 
subpoena directed to Emery Mining. (R. at 381-82). The Attor-
ney General then argued that since the subpoenas had been with-
drawn, the constitutional challenges to the Act were moot. 
(Tr. of Hearing, Sept. 12, 1984 at p. 87). Apparently the 
Attorney General opened a new investigation in Salt Lake County 
at about this time. (R. at 382). From the record it does not 
appear that the Third District Court knew or had any way of 
knowing about the constitutional challenges leveled at the Act, 
or about the restrictions imposed by Judge Bunnell on the 
Attorney Generalfs use of the subpoena power. 
On August 21, 1984, Emery Mining joined those chal-
lenging the Act by moving to quash its subpoena. Following a 
hearing held on September 12, 1984, the Seventh District Court 
quashed the subpoena served on Emery Mining and allowed those 
respondents charged criminally in the Fifth Circuit Court to 
examine the Attorney General's "good cause" affidavit. (Tr. of 
Hearing, Sept. 12, 1984 at p. 123). Several days later, the 
court issued a memorandum opinion finding that the Attorney 
General1s Office had engaged in a course of unrestrained abuse 
-5-
as a result of the Act's lack of standards and declaring the 
Act unconstitutionally vague. (R. at 734). Based on its rul-
ing, the court dismissed the criminal investigation and the 
Attorney General filed this appeal. 
Respondents filed motions with this Court seeking to 
supplement the record on appeal by including for jji camera 
review all subpoenas issued by the Attorney General in the 
course of the criminal investigation. The Attorney General 
strenuously resisted these motions and this Court took the 
matter under advisement pending receipt of the parties' briefs 
on the merits. The Attorney General admits in his brief, how-
ever, that numerous subpoenas were served on third parties. 
(Appellant's Brief at pp. 5-6). Respondents, as well as this 
Court, are presently without means to review the scope of those 
subpoenas. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
An important aspect of the due process doctrine of 
vagueness is that a legislature must establish minimum guide-
lines to govern law enforcement agencies in their administra-
tion of criminal statutes. Few governmental powers demand 
closer scrutiny and stricter controls than the power of compul-
sory process, especially where coupled with the opportunity for 
secret interrogations and the power to criminally charge. Yet 
the Subpoena Powers Act contains virtually no standards to 
guide prosecutors in their exercise of these vast powers. In 
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addition, the Act removes the court from the subpoena and 
secret interrogation process, thus severely restricting the 
capability for judicial supervision over a prosecutorfs use of 
these powers. 
The lack of standards to guide prosecutors invites 
abuse; the removal of judicial supervision allows abuses to 
occur. The power to conduct entire investigations, including 
secret interrogations, results in the potential for undetect-
able prosecutorial abuse. 
Examples of the known abusive conduct engaged in under 
the Act by the Attorney General in the present case include 
issuing subpoenas which exceeded the scope of the investiga-
tion, conducting overlapping investigations and forum shopping. 
Under the Act, prosecutors frustrated witness1 rights to chal-
lenge subpoenas, precluded the authorizing court from reviewing 
subpoenas issued in its name and used subpoenas to gather evi-
dence after charges had been filed. Evidence obtained pursuant 
to the investigative power was improperly utilized in civil 
proceedings by prosecutors acting in both civil and criminal 
proceedings. On the other hand, criminal defendants were 
denied access to evidence necessary for the preparation of 
their defenses and subpoenaed witnesses were told not to 
discuss their testimony with criminal defendants or their 
counsel. 
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The Subpoena Powers Act creates a "one-man grand jury" 
by vesting in a prosecutor the power to subpoena witnesses, 
grant immunity and act in secret. The Act grants to the prose-
cutor all of the powers of a grand jury, but provides for none 
of the safeguards. The Act eliminates the presence of an inde-
pendent arbiter, while neither on its face nor in its applica-
tion does the Act provide the mandatory procedural protections 
to which subpoenaed individuals are entitled under Article I, 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution and this Courtfs decision 
in State v. Ruggeri, infra. These protections include the 
right to be warned against self-incrimination, the right to be 
advised of the nature and scope of the investigation and the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel, particularly 
during questioning. 
Finally, the Act allows an unrestricted exercise of 
the judicial subpoena power by an executive officer in viola-
tion of the separation of powers doctrine. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE SUBPOENA POWERS ACT VIOLATES THE DUE 
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
A. Due Process Requires Statutes to Contain Appro-
priate Standards to Guide Law Enforcement Personnel. 
The Utah Constitution, as well as the United States 
Constitution, declare that "No person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty or property without due process of law." Utah 
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Const. art* I, § 7; U.S. Const, amend. 5. The concept of due 
process includes the requirement that governmental entities 
charged with enforcing the law be guided in their actions by a 
set of reasonable standards. The United States Supreme Court 
recently emphasized that fact in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 
352, 75 L.Ed. 2d 903 (1983), wherein it stated: 
Although the [vagueness] doctrine focuses 
both on actual notice to citizens and arbi-
trary enforcement, we have recognized 
recently that the more important aspect of 
vagueness doctrine is not actual notice, but 
the other principle element of the doctrine -
the requirement that a legislature establish 
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement, 
(citation omitted) Where the legislature 
fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a 
criminal statute may permit "a standardless 
sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, 
and juries to pursue their personal predilic-
tions. 
461 U.S. at , 75 L.Ed.2d at 909, quoting Smith v. Goguen, 
415 U.S. 566, 574-75 (1974) (Emphasis added). 
The Subpoena Powers Act fails to provide the minimal 
standards necessary to guide prosecutors in their use of powers 
granted under the Act. The 1980 amendment to the Act elimi-
nated the only judicial restrictions on a prosecutor's use of 
these powers. First, the amendment eliminated court approval 
of the issuance of subpoenas and vested absolute control in the 
prosecutor. Under the original Act as adopted in 1971, sub-
poenas were issued only "upon application and approval of the 
district court for good cause shown, . . . ." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-45-20 (1953). Under the Act as amended, a court, in whose 
name and under whose authority the subpoenas are issued, is 
removed from the subpoena process once a criminal investigation 
is authorized. 
Second, the 1980 amendment eliminated the court's 
ability to supervise the taking of testimony in secret. The 
original version of the Act provided that upon written applica-
tion by a prosecutor, the district court could "order that 
interrogation of any witness shall be before a closed court; 
that such proceeding be secret; and that the record of such 
testimony be kept secret unless and until the court for good 
cause otherwise orders." I<&. (Emphasis added.) The amended 
Act allows the prosecutor to take testimony in secret without 
the supervision and protection of the court. Utah Code Ann. 
S 77-22-2(3) (1982). 
Unless challenged by a recipient of a subpoena, the 
only restriction on a prosecutor's use of the subpoena power is 
his own determination of what may be "relevant." Utah Code 
Ann. S 77-22-2(1) (1953). Because of the elimination of judi-
cial supervision, a subpoenaed witness1 rights are protected 
only by the prosecutor's conscience. Due to its lack of stan-
dards to guide prosecutorial conduct, the Act is susceptible to 
a wide variety of potential abuses. The record in this case 
demonstrates that many of the potential abuses actually occur-
red. 
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B. The Act Does Not Include Any Means of Determining 
Whether a Prosecutor is Exceeding the Scope of the Authorized 
Investigation. 
1. Once authorized, an investigation is subject only 
to the prosecutor's determination of relevance. 
Once a district court has granted a prosecutor's 
application to conduct an investigation under the Act, the 
court is removed from the picture. Since the individual sub-
poenas are not approved by the court in advance nor returned 
and filed after service, the court has no way of knowing 
whether the subpoenas bear any relevance to the purpose and 
scope of the authorized investigation. The only limitation on 
a prosecutor is his own discretion as to what may be relevant. 
The Act allows a prosecutor to intrude into the private affairs 
of every citizen with no limitations save the prosecutor's con-
science. 
In the present case, certain of the challenged sub-
poenas duces tecum indicate the manner in which the Attorney 
General exceeded the authorized scope of the investigation. 
(a) The Emery Mining Subpoena, The subpoena 
served on Emery Mining commanded its custodian of records to 
produce: 
records which identify all officers, direc-
tors, consultants and employees (both union 
and non-union, professional and mining) of 
Emery Mining for the period 1979 to present. 
Such shall include, but not be limited to, 
names, addresses, telephone numbers, dates of 
employment and employee numbers, if known. 
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(R. at 641; See Appendix "D* hereto). This subpoena exceeded 
the scope of the investigation authorized by the court in two 
ways. First, the time period for which the information was 
requested grossly exceeded the time period targeted by the 
Attorney General in its application to conduct the investiga-
tion. Second, the subpoena demands production of information 
with respect to all employees of Emery Mining. This includes 
everyone from the lowest custodians and miner1s helpers to the 
President of the company. It also includes thousands of rank 
and file miners who worked during that five-year period. This 
request is well outside the scope of the investigation autho-
rized by the court. 
(b) The Colby and Stott subpoenas requesting 
information relating to uranium properties. The Attorney 
General served subpoenas on respondents Colby and Stott demand-
ing detailed information concerning UP&I/s dealings in uranium 
properties. (R. at 171, 173). Judge Bunnell recognized the 
overbreadth of the subpoenas, stating: 
A previous subpoena issued by the Attor-
ney General's office attempted to get into 
Utah Power and Light Company's dealings in 
uranium mining, when in fact the original 
Good Cause Affidavit mentioned no indication 
of any criminal dealings in this area. 
(Memorandum Decision Relative to Constitutionality at p.2) (R. 
at 735). 
(c) Subpoena to Newell Johnson, CPA. A third 
example of the abuse which resulted under the Act is reflected 
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by the subpoena served on respondent Mike Thompson's accounting 
firm ordering the production of the following: 
[A]ll books, records, papers of any kind 
relating to Mike Thompson and Associates, 
Guardex, Alarmex, Vanguard, Mike Thompson, 
individually; Mike Ziemski, individually; 
Bruce Conklin, individually; Patsy Bowman, 
individually; and all other individuals 
and/or entities associated therewith. 
(R. at 223) (Emphasis added). This subpoena is so broad it 
would have commanded the production of the personal records of 
Thompson's attorney if he had employed the same accounting 
firm. (Tr. of Hearing, Sept. 12, 1984 at p. 47). 
These three examples came to the district court's 
attention only because they were challenged by the recipients. 
Due to the secrecy Order and the Attorney General's resistance 
to filing all issued subpoenas, the full extent of prosecu-
torial abuse in this investigation is unknown. The Attorney 
General's reluctance to allow this Court to review the unchal-
lenged subpoenas prompts the inference that they are similarly 
abusive. This conclusion is not particularly surprising in 
light of the fact that at least some of the subpoenas appear to 
have been drafted by the investigator, Wayne Wickizer, rather 
than by attorneys in the Attorney General's Office. (See Tr. 
of Darcie White depo., p. 4). 
2* Due to the Generic Nature of the Investigation 
Authorized under the Act, Overlapping Investigations could be 
Opened in Separate Counties. 
The Act authorizes a prosecutor to conduct an investi-
gation by subpoenaing witnesses and conducting secret examina-
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tions anywhere within his jurisdiction which, in the case of 
the Attorney General, is statewide. Thus, the Attorney General 
may, as he did here, receive authorization to conduct an 
investigation from one court and proceed to investigate 
activity throughout the entire state. If the prosecutor is 
challenged in the authorizing district court, he can, under the 
veil of secrecy, do as he has done here and simply move to a 
new district court, obtain identical authority to conduct the 
same investigation, and continue with the investigation until 
challenged again. The significance of this problem is demon-
strated in the present case where the Seventh District Court 
was only able to see the full pattern of prosecutorial abuse as 
a result of cumulative challenges over a period of several 
months. 
Under the Act as adopted in 1971, each subpoena was 
authorized and issued as an isolated and independent occur-
rence. Each subpoena was justified on the basis of its own 
showing of good cause. For this reason, there was little like-
lihood of overlapping requests before different courts. Simi-
larly, there was no need for a reviewing court to look beyond 
the subpoena and its good cause showing to determine whether it 
was abusive. 
The problem of overlapping investigations is exempli-
fied by the Attorney General's actions in the present case. In 
response to the motions to quash and constitutional challenges 
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leveled at the Act in the Seventh District Court, the Attorney 
General's Office withdrew the subpoenas issued in the name of 
that court and argued that the challenges to the subpoena power 
were thereby rendered moot. Simultaneously, the Attorney 
General apparently opened an identical investigation in Salt 
Lake County. Due to the secrecy Order in place, the Salt Lake 
County District Court had no knowledge, and no means of obtain-
ing knowledge, of the events which had transpired in the 
Seventh District Court. 
C. The Secrecy Provision of the Act Restricts the 
Ability of the Court to Review the Use of its Subpoena Power 
and Prevents the Effective Assistance of Counsel. 
1. Unless challenged, the subpoenas are never 
reviewed by the court. 
The Act contains no requirement that subpoenas issued 
by a prosecutor be submitted to a court for review prior to 
service or that the subpoenas be returned and filed with the 
court once served. Unless challenged, the court has no way of 
knowing what is being done under its name and authority. Even 
when a particular subpoena is challenged, the court is unable 
to see how it fits into the overall pattern of the investiga-
tion. 
By way of example, the Attorney General has strenu-
ously resisted respondents1 requests that the other subpoenas 
issued during the investigation be filed with the court for an 
in camera review. Judge Bunnell was never given the opportun-
ity to inspect the other subpoenas and later ruled that he had 
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no authority under the Act to require the Attorney General to 
present the court's own subpoenas for review. (See Appendix "E* 
attached hereto). As of the present, the other subpoenas are 
not part of this record although the Attorney General has 
described some of them in some detail in his brief. (Brief of 
Appel- lant at pp. 5-6). 
2* The secrecy provision of the Act increases the 
danger of inconsistent rulings by courts. 
As discussed abovey the Act does not protect against 
overlapping investigations. Because of the secrecy provisions 
of the Act, it is entirely possible that two separate district 
courts could issue contradictory rulings on the interpretation 
or validity of certain subpoenas or practices and never be 
aware of the other's ruling. This ability to proceed in 
several jurisdictions also infringes on the right of appeal to 
this Court. Utah Const, art. VIII, S 9. 
For example, on May 30, 1984, in response to motions 
to quash filed by respondents UP&L, Maxfield, Colby and Stott, 
the Seventh District Court expressed substantial reservations 
about the Actfs constitutionality and upheld the Act only by 
reading into it certain procedural safeguards. (Tr. of Hear-
ing, May 30, 1984 at p. 68). When the Attorney General opened 
a new investigative proceeding in Salt Lake County later that 
year, there was no way for the Third District Court to know of 
Judge Bunnell's ruling. 
-16-
3# The Act allows prosecutorial "forum shopping," 
Although the ability of the courts to review the use 
of their subpoenas is limited under the Act to those occasions 
where particular subpoenas are challenged, the Attorney General 
takes the position that he may divest the courts of even that 
limited power of review. Nothing in the Act precludes a prose-
cutor from withdrawing a subpoena once it is challenged and 
moving the investigation to a different district court. Like-
wise, if upon challenge a court imposes conditions on the exer-
cise of the subpoena power, the prosecutor can simply move to 
another county, open an investigation and proceed anew. The 
new court would be unaware of either the challenge or the 
adverse ruling because of the secrecy provisions of the Act. 
Within the State of Utah, the Attorney General has a potential 
of 29 different courts to which he can turn in hopes of obtain-
ing the desired ruling. This significantly diminishes the 
"opportunity to challenge" that the Attorney General argues 
provides the necessary review and protection. 
The Attorney General barely survived the first round 
of constitutional challenges by respondents UP&L, Maxfield, 
Colby and Stott. The Court expressed reservations about the 
Act's constitutionality and imposed procedural restrictions on 
the Attorney General's exercise of the subpoena power. When 
faced with a renewed and expanded attack, the State withdrew 
its subpoenas and claimed that any constitutional challenges to 
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the Act were moot. The Attorney General hoped to remove juris-
diction from the judge who had already expressed grave concerns 
about the Act's constitutionality. Then the Attorney General 
opened a new, presumably identical, investigation in Salt Lake 
County. (R. at 380-81). 
4. The secrecy provision of the Act frustrates the 
ability to effectively attack abusive conduct on the part of 
prosecutors. 
The secrecy provision of the Act and the lack of prior 
judicial review minimizes the likelihood that abuses of the 
subpoena power will be detected or' effectively challenged. 
Subpoenas served on third parties, such as financial institu-
tions and record custodians, are kept secret. Even though the 
subpoenas may exceed the scope of the investigation or seek 
privileged information/ there is little likelihood of challenge 
since the third parties have no incentive to do so. As the 
United States Supreme Court recently noted in a case involving 
an IRS summons, a third party who is not the target of the 
summons "might have little incentive to oppose enforcement 
vigorously.* Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc. v. United States, 
U.S. , 53 U.S.L.W. 4078, 4080 (1985). The Court went on to 
state that in a situation where the IRS is not confronted by an 
adversary, it "could use its summons power to engage in 'fish-
ing expeditions1 that might unnecessarily trample upon taxpayer 
privacy." Id. 
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The Attorney General's service of subpoenas upon non-
target, third parties under the Act gives rise to the same con-
cerns and abuses* While Congress has statutorily created pro-
tections against the IRS1 abuse of its summons power by either 
allowing the targeted party notice and an opportunity to chal-
lenge the summons or requiring that a court exert a restraining 
influence on the IRS, 26 U.S.C. S 7209, the Subpoena Powers Act 
provides no opportunity to a targeted individual to challenge 
third party subpoenas or, for that matter, to obtain notice of 
subpoenas served on third parties* 
The Attorney General admits that as part of its 
investigation it has served numerous subpoenas on third parties 
who are not targets of the investigation, (Brief of Appellant 
at pp. 5-6). Since none of these third parties have come for-
ward to challenge the subpoenas, neither this Court nor respon-
dents have any way of knowing to whom the subpoenas were issued 
or what information was sought or received as a result. The 
secrecy provisions, both on their face and as applied, allow an 
investigation to proceed in secret as well as allowing the 
interrogation of witnesses in secret. The secrecy provisions 
also allow the prosecutor to keep from counsel for any witness 
any facts about the nature and scope of the investigation and 
the identity of its targets. In other words, a witness may be 
deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. 
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D. The Act Allows for Continued Abuse Once Criminal 
Charges Have Been Filed, 
1. A Prosecutor may continue to gather evidence by 
means of subpoenas after criminal charges have been filed, 
Utah's Subpoena Powers Act has somtimes been referred 
to as the "mini-grand jury act" because of the powers it con-
fers on the prosecutor. KUTVy Inc. v. Conder, 635 P.2d 412 
(Utah 1981). It is highly improper for a prosecutor in a grand 
jury setting to continue to gather evidence by means of a grand 
jury subpoena once an individual is charged. United States v. 
Doss, 563 F.2d 265, 275 (6th Cir. 1977); See also United States 
v. Santucci , 504 F.Supp. 1072, 1075 (N.D. 111. 1980). Never-
theless, in the present case the Attorney General continued to 
use subpoenas to gather evidence against several of the respon-
dents even after criminal charges had been filed against them. 
For example, the subpoena to Mike Thompson's CPA, discussed 
above, was issued on May 14, 1984, several weeks after the com-
plaint was filed in Fifth Circuit Court. 
2. The secrecy provisions of the Act allow a prose-
cutor to withhold evidence which would otherwise be discover-
able by a criminal defendant. 
Once an individual is charged with a crime, he is 
entitled to discover certain information necessary to the prep-
aration of his defense. Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-16(5) (1953). 
Typically this would include prior statements of witnesses, 
People v. Shaw, 646 P.2d 375, 381 (Colo. 1982), and affidavits 
filed by the State. People v. Mendez, 28 App. Div. 2d 727, 281 
-20-
N.Y.S. 2d 608 (1967)• Because of the Act's secrecy provisions, 
however, a prosecutor is able to withhold such information from 
a criminal defendant. 
For example, after charges had been filed against 
several of the respondents herein, the Attorney General refused 
to make available to them the Good Cause Affidavit upon which 
the criminal investigation was based. The Attorney General 
disclosed the Affidavit only when ordered to do so by the 
Seventh District Court. 
3. The Attorney General used the secrecy provisions 
of the Act to prevent witnesses from talking to criminal defen-
dants or their counsel. 
In the course of their secret depositions of wit-
nesses, members of the Attorney General's Office told witnesses 
that they were prohibited under the secrecy order from speaking 
to anyone about the questions asked and answers given. For 
example, in the secret deposition of Darcie White, the follow-
ing statements were made: 
[Mr. Olsen] Mr. White, let me just remind you 
of something that Steve may well 
have talked to you about, but for 
purposes of making sure that we're 
clear on this, the proceedings here 
are pursuant to an investigative 
subpoena and are under a secrecy 
order. I would just remind you 
that the proceedings here, the 
questions, etc., are secret. They 
certainly may be discussed with Mr. 
Nebeker but not with others. The 
other question I have is—well, let 
me ask you if you understand that. 
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MR. NEBEKER: Let me ask you on what authority 
you're telling him that he can't 
discuss this with anyone 
MR. OLSEN: Pursuant to the secrecy order. 
* * * 
MR. NEBEKER: Are you saying that this order says 
that these people cannot talk to 
anyone? Is that how you're inter-
preting this? 
MR. OLSEN: Well, I think with the exception of 
the attorney, that is correct. I 
don't know what the— 
MS. DALLIMORE: Well, Steve, I think, at a minimum, 
it would be better for everyone 
concerned if a lot of people didn't 
do a lot of talking to each other 
about these proceedings and, spe-
cifically, of course, if Mr. 
Fletcher called you on the phone, 
don't you think it would be more 
appropriate that it not be dis-
cussed? 
(Tr. of Darcie White depo. at pp. 161-64). Although Mr. White's 
counsel took exception to the Attorney General's admonition, 
the prosecutors remained adamant. Ij3. at 165. Unrepresented 
witnesses may have been examined on the most irrelevant and 
even privileged matters and not come forward to disclose the 
same because of the prosecutor's admonition. This conduct is 
improper and abusive in that it tends to "lock up" a witness' 
testimony and prevents counsel for a criminal defendant from 
effectively preparing a defense. It also reduces the likeli-
hood that abusive practices of the prosecutor will be brought 
to light and challenged. 
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E. The Act Contains no Standards to Prohibit 
Improper Ose of Evidence Gathered in Criminal Investigations, 
Because of the unrestrained control of the prosecutor 
over use of the subpoena power and the cloak of secrecy which 
envelops the investigation, the authorizing court has no means 
of ascertaining how the gathered evidence is actually being 
used. Since the court has no means of knowing to whom sub-
poenas have been served, it has no way of tracking either the 
source of evidence or creating a record of the evidence itself. 
In addition, it is impossible to determine whether the subpoena 
power in the criminal investigation is also being used to 
gather evidence for use in civil or administrative proceedings. 
The seriousness of that problem is even more acute where, as in 
this case, the same attorneys for the State are involved in the 
criminal, civil, and administrative aspects of a case. 
The United States Supreme Court recently condemned the 
use of grand jury subpoenas to obtain evidence for use in civil 
actions in the case of United States v. Sells Engineering, 
Inc., U.S. , 77 L.Ed.2d 743, 757 (1983), stating: 
[Bjecause the Government takes an active 
part in the activities of the grand jury, 
disclosure to government attorneys for civil 
use poses a significant threat to the 
integrity of the grand jury itself. If 
prosecutors in a given case knew that their 
colleagues would be free to use the mater-
ials generated by the grand jury for a civil 
case, they might be tempted to manipulate 
the grand jury's powerful investigative 
tools to root out additional evidence useful 
in the civil suit, or even to start or con-
tinue a grand jury inquiry where no criminal 
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prosecution seemed likely. Any such use of 
grand jury proceedings to elicit evidence 
for use in a civil case is improper per se« 
(Emphasis added)• 
The same attorneys from the Attorney General's Office 
(notably Ms. Dallimore) are involved in three separate, 
although related proceedings. In addition to its involvement 
in the criminal investigation, the Attorney General1s Office 
has been involved in a proceeding before the Utah Public 
Service Commission involving allegations of misconduct on the 
part of UP&L and Emery Mining. The Attorney General's Office 
has also been involved in a factually related civil anti-trust 
case against those parties who have already been charged crimi-
nally as a result of this investigation. It is unrealistic to 
believe that these prosecutors can segregate in their minds 
evidence obtained in the criminal proceedings from that gath-
ered elsewhere. 
P. other State Subpoena Powers Statutes Provide 
Standards to Guide Prosecutorial Conduct. 
A survey of state statutes for provisions similar to 
the Utah Subpoena Powers Act reveals that the few states grant-
ing investigative subpoena power to prosecutors have done so in 
a manner which (1) preserves judicial approval or, (2) is not 
subject to a secrecy provision. No state subpoena power stat-
ute was found, other than Utah's, which gives the prosecutor 
not only unbridled discretion in the use of the subpoena power, 
but the right to request that the proceedings be held in secret. 
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The Montana statute requires court issuance of each 
subpoena upon a showing of cause, much the same as the Utah Act 
prior to the 1980 Amendment. Mont. Code Ann, S 46-4-301 (1983) 
provides: 
Whenever the attorney general or a county 
attorney has a duty to investigate alleged 
unlawful activity# any Justice of the 
Supreme Court or District Court Judge of 
this state may cause subpoenas to be issued 
commanding the persons to whom they are 
directed to appear before the attorney 
general or the county attorney and give 
testimony and produce such books, records, 
papers, documents and other objects as may 
be necessary and proper to the investiga-
tion. A subpoena may issue only when it 
appears upon the affidavit of the attorney 
general or the county attorney that the 
administration of justice requires it to be 
issued. (Emphasis added). 
The Montana statute further provides that if a subpoenaed wit-
ness does not have funds to obtain counsel, the judge or 
justice shall appoint counsel for him. Mont. Code Ann. 
S 46-4-304 (1983). 
The Louisiana statute also requires judicial approval 
of each subpoena. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. Art. 66 (West Supp. 
1984) provides: 
Upon written motion of the attorney general 
or district attorney setting forth reason-
able grounds therefor, the court may order 
the clerk to issue subpoenas directed to the 
persons named in the motion, ordering them 
to appear at a time and place designated in 
the order for questioning by the attorney 
general or district attorney respectively, 
concerning any offense under investigation 
by him. The court may also order the issu-
ance of a subpoena duces tecum. (Emphasis 
added). 
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In Utah, a citizen is faced with a subpoena that 
appears to have been issued by the court when in fact it has 
been issued by the Attorney General. Arguably, a citizen will 
be less likely to resist what appears to be a court-authorized 
subpoena. Under the Louisiana and Montana provisions, what the 
citizen perceives is indeed the case, i.e., the court has 
authorized the issuance of the subpoena. In short, the citi-
zen's natural inclination to comply with a court order is 
justified. 
Two other states also have statutes with respect to 
investigative subpoenas. Iowa Code S 813.2, Rule 5(6) (1979) 
provides: 
The clerk of the district court, on written 
application of the prosecuting attorney and 
the approval of the court, shall issue sub-
poenas including subpoenas duces tecum For 
such witnesses as the prosecuting attorney 
may require in investigating an offense 
. . . . (Emphasis added). 
Under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3101 (1981), after an 
application has been filed with a district judge requesting 
authority to conduct an inquisition, "the judge with whom it is 
filed shall, on the written praecipe of the attorney general, 
assistant attorney general or county attorney, issue a subpoena 
for the witnesses named in such praecipe commanding them to 
appear and testify . • . ." In addition to judicial involve-
ment in the issuance of subpoenas, the Kansas statute, unlike 
the Utah Act, does not provide that the proceedings may be held 
in secret. 
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Only Delaware has an investigative subpoena statute 
similar to Utah's Act in that the attorney general alone is 
authorized to issue investigative subpoenas. The Delaware 
statute does not, however, provide prosecutors with a device 
whereby interroga- tions can be conducted in secret. See Del. 
Code Ann. Title 29 S 2508 (1974) (See Appendix "A" hereto). 
II. 
THE SUBPOENA POWERS ACT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY 
DEFICIENT IN THAT IT FAILS TO PROTECT FUNDA-
MENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
In KUTV, Inc. v. Conder, supra, 635 P.2d 412 (Utah 
1981), this Court declared that the Subpoena Powers Act essen-
tially created a "mini-grand jury" by vesting in prosecutors 
the power to subpoena witnesses and grant immunity, and the 
ability to do so in secrecy. A significant distinction between 
the "mini-grand jury" created by the Subpoena Powers Act and a 
grand jury convened under the direction and supervision of a 
district court is that the Subpoena Powers Act vests in the 
prosecutor virtually all of the powers of the grand jury, but 
provides none of the procedural protections. 
The grand jury is an extension of the court and stands 
between the prosecutor and the accused or witnesses subpoenaed 
to appear. United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., supra, 77 
L. Ed.2d at 752 (1983). In other words, the grand jury acts as 
a buffer between the one charged with the responsibility of 
prosecuting and the one being prosecuted. The Subpoena Powers 
Act provides for no such buffer or protection. 
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Notwithstanding the role of the grand jury as a buffer 
between the prosecutor and those appearing before it, this 
Court found it important to provide additional safeguards for 
witnesses in the grand jury setting. In State v. Ruggeri# 19 
Utah 2d 216, 429 P.2d 969 (1967), in an opinion authored by 
Justice Ellett, concurred in by Justice Tuckett specifically 
and by Justice Henroid by means of a separate concurring 
opinion, it was held that when a target of an investigation is 
subpoenaed before a grand jury he is an "accused" within the 
meaning of Utah Const, art. I, S 12 and is entitled to the pro-
tections guaranteed therein. In Ruggeriy a county commissioner 
was subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury and compelled to 
give testimony. The witness was neither informed nor was he 
aware that he was a target of the investigation. With respect 
to issues addressed in Ruggeri which are pertinent to this 
appeal, a majority of the Court agreed that any witness sub-
poenaed to appear before the grand jury is in custody and is 
entitled to the custodial interrogation warnings prescribed by 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Justice Ellett 
stated: 
The target of an investigation is an accused 
within the meaning of the Constitution and 
when he is detained in any significant way, 
he may not be interrogated unless he is 
advised of the charges against him then under 
consideration. To fail to so warn one so 
being investigated is to entrap him and to 
violate his constitutional privilege against 
self-incrimination. 
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19 Utah 2d at 223, 429 P.2d at 973. 
An accused within the meaning of Utah Const, art. I, 
§ 12 is entitled to be warned of his right against self incrim-
ination, to be informed of the scope of the investigation and 
to be advised of his right to have counsel present during the 
interrogation. This includes being informed that if he cannot 
afford counsel, the court will appoint counsel for him. 
The Attorney General acknowledges the absence of these 
protections both in the literal language and in the application 
of the Act. The State seems to view itself, however, as the 
entity responsible for recognizing and protecting these rights. 
According to an Assistant Attorney General: 
The best that state prosecutors can do, at 
this point, is to act in the way that seems 
most fair, and that protects individual con-
stitutional rights as they may appear. 
(R. at 146). 
In the instant case, respondent Fletcher was entrap-
ped, much like the county commissioner in Ruggeri, into volun-
teering testimony without having been warned that he was a 
target of the Attorney General's investigation. Additionally, 
none of the employees of UP&L were informed whether they were 
targets of the investigation nor were they advised as to the 
scope of the investigation although their counsel specificaly 
requested such information. (Tr. of Darcie White depo. at pp. 
3-6). 
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In sum, the Subpoena Powers Act frees the prosecutor 
of limitations inherent in the grand jury system and of the 
restraining influence of the court's presence and allows him to 
compel testimony in secret with only his conscience to protect 
individuals1 rights. 
III. 
THE ACT CONTRAVENES THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
REQUIREMENT THAT THERE BE A SEPARATION OF 
POWERS BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL 
BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT. 
The separation of powers doctrine contained in Article 
V, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
The powers of the government of the 
State of Utah shall be divided into three 
distinct departments, the legislative, the 
executive, and the judicial; and no person 
charged with the exercise of powers properly 
belonging to one of these departments, shall 
exercise any functions appertaining to either 
of the others, except in the cases herein 
expressly directed or permitted, 
(Emphasis added). 
With regard to the allocation of powers among the 
branches of state government, this Court has declared: 
The departments are all upon the same plane: 
are all coordinate branches of the same 
government; each absolute within its sphere, 
except as limited or controlled by the Con-
stitution of the State or of the United 
States. The apportionment of distinct power 
to one department of itself implies an 
inhibition against its exercise by either of 
the other departments. 
Kimball v. City of Grantsville, 19 Utah 368, 382-83, 57 P.l, 4 
(Utah 1899) (Emphasis added). 
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As discussed at length above, the Act vests in a pro-
secutor almost unchecked authority to subpoena witnesses and 
take testimony in secret• The subpoenas, although issued by 
the Attorney General, bear the name of the district court and 
indicate that failure to comply will result in being found in 
contempt of court. Once the investigation is approved, the 
district court is virtually powerless to supervise or review 
the issuance of the subpoenas, unless a particular subpoena is 
challenged. Likewise, the court has no control over the inter-
rogation of witnesses conducted in secret. 
Under the Act, a prosecutor is transformed into a one-
man grand jury. KUTV, Inc. v. Conder, supra. It is well 
accepted, however, that the grand jury is merely an extension 
of the court; that is, part of the judicial branch of govern-
ment. In re Moe, 617 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Hawaii 1980). A prose-
cutor, on the other hand, is a member of the executive branch. 
When acting as a one-man grand jury, the prosecutor impermiss-
ibly wears the hats of two branches. 
In State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977), this 
Court declared it a violation of the separation of powers doc-
trine to grant the Attorney General power to add or delete sub-
stances covered by the Utah Controlled Substance Act. The 
Court noted that such a grant of power placed the Attorney 
General, a member of the executive branch, in a position to 
carry out functions properly vested in the legislative branch. 
The Court stated: 
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[T]he person, who is to be alert to possible 
constitutional infirmities, is participating 
in the legislative process by determining an 
essential element of a crime and the 
penalty. . . . 
If Article V, Section 1, has any pur-
pose it is to prohibit the concentration of 
legislative and executive powers in one 
person. 
Id. at 686 (Emphasis in original). The same could be said with 
respect to concentrating judicial and executive powers in one 
person, as is the case under the Subpoena Powers Act. 
Where a court authorizes, directs and controls the use 
of its subpoena power, there exists no violation of the separa-
tion of powers doctrine. Ashton-Jenkins Co. v. Bramel, 56 Utah 
587, 192 P.375 (Utah 1920). Under the original Act, the dis-
trict court acted as a check on the prosecutor's powers. Under 
the amended Act, the prosecutor's conscience replaces the 
court. This vesting of power in the prosecutor constitutes 
nothing less than a grant of judicial power to an executive 
officer and is directly in conflict with the separation of 
powers doctrine. 
IV. 
THE SUBPOENA POWERS ACT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A 
PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY. 
Courts generally accord legislative enactments a pre-
sumption of validity. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 
1983). However, the presumption is rebuttable and a court is 
obligated to strike down legislative acts where "the interests 
of justice in the particular case before it require doing so 
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because the act is clearly in conflict with the higher laws set 
forth in the Constitution. " Zamora v. Draper, 635 P. 2d 78, 80 
(Utah 1981). Where a statute encroaches on fundamental per-
sonal liberties, as is the case herein, the presumption of 
validity is more easily overcome. 
The legislative history behind the original Act indi-
cates that considerable emphasis was placed on the need for 
judicial supervision over the subpoena power. Representative 
Fisher, the sponsor of the original Act, proposed an amendment 
to the Bill stating: 
It is suggested that the subpoena power be 
limited to approval of the district court 
and so on line four, after the word "right11 
"have the right", insert the word "upon 
application and approval of the district 
court for good cause shown." 
(Tr. of House Debates on H.B. No. 121, March 10, 1971, p.5) (R. 
at 292). Representative Florence also expressed concern about 
the potential for abuse absent court supervision: 
I've had it expressed to my by a couple of 
county attorneys that they are in favor of 
this amendment not so much that they are in 
fear of abuse by their own office, but it is 
subject to possible abuse. In a sense, it 
involves a possible dragnet situation if we 
allowed complete discretion with the prose-
cuting attorney to subpoena any person that 
he may want even though that individual would 
have to be given immunity prior to testifying 
to any criminal implication. It is still 
something which delves upon an individual's 
personal freedom and right to privacy and 
there should be some limited area where a 
person could, in fact, have this reviewable 
by a judicial body based on probable cause so 
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it cannot be a spurious subpoena to investi-
gate into matters which totally are without 
the realm of some criminal activity. 
(Tr. of House Debates on H.B. No. 121, March 10, 1971, p.7) (R. 
at 294). Representative Fisher clearly indicated that advance 
judicial approval was necessary for the issuance of subpoenas, 
stating: 
Representative Mecham will remember that his 
Ombudsman Bill was declared unconstitutional 
because it gave no protection to the subpoena 
power that the committee obtained under the 
bill that we passed and, for that reason, the 
court said it was not a constitutional Act; 
at least in this instance. Now, we have 
required that these subpoenas be issued the 
same as would a search warrant of a person's 
home or search warrant of his car or his 
person. 
(Tr. of House Debates on H.B. No. 121, March 10, 1971, pp. 
12-13) (Emphasis added) (R. at 299-300). 
The legislative history behind the 1980 amendment does 
not reveal any reason for the elimination of the judicial pro-
tections that had been of such concern to the enacting legis-
lators. The 1980 Legislature apparently thought it was simply 
recodifying the criminal procedure code. This fact is 
reflected by statements made by Representative Livingston dur-
ing debates on the redocification: 
The Chief of Police of Provo . . . called and 
asked for the status of House Bill 32 and 
literally pleaded with me for the sake of his 
local enforcement that House Bill 32 be 
passed and his comment is not far different 
from those that I've related to you before 
from County Attorneys, from judges and others 
throughout the state who have said 'The 
Bill's not perfect, it's not the way that I 
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would write it if I had the total authorship 
but the need to have this occur is so great 
and we are so hamstrung right now with the 
confusion regarding the rules of the game, 
the rules of procedure that we need this Bill 
passed." . . • House Bill 32 is a lengthy 
bill and I apologize to you for the length of 
that particularity in a budget session 
. . . . Let me point out that a third of 
what is before you is already in the Utah 
Code. It is simply reputting and reenacting 
it. 
(Tr. of Legislative Debates, H.B. 32, Jan. 19, 1980 at p. 2) 
(Emphasis added) (R. at 315). 
Representative Pox expressed concern over the passage 
of such a massive and important bill during a budget session, 
as follows: 
I'm a bit concerned about the size of this 
bill that we have before us in this very busy 
budget session. It's 161 pages long. There 
is some very subtle but very significant 
changes that are being made in our criminal 
code. I'm concerned that we as busy legisla-
tors haven't had the time to read all 161 
pages and understand the changes . . . . I 
think there is no question that we need a 
revision in our criminal code but I believe 
that a revision should be done at a time when 
we as a legislature have enough time to be 
able to take a solid look at these changes, 
at what these changes are going to mean. 
Id. at 7 (Emphasis added) (R. at 320). The inference is clear 
that the 1980 Legislature intended only to re-codify the 
criminal procedure statues, rather than make sweeping 
substantive changes which were in direct conflict with prior 
legislative intent* 
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Not only is the 1980 amendment in conflict with prior 
legislative purpose, it also contravenes the "One Subject" rule 
contained in Article VI, Section 22 of the Otah Constitution 
since substantive changes were made during what was supposedly 
a re-codification. For these reasons, the presumption of 
validity generally given to legislative enactments is seriously 
eroded with respect to the 1980 amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Subpoena Powers Act ignores constitutional safe-
guards that were designed to protect individuals from abuses 
which may occur when unbridled power is given to any 
governmental body. Not only does the Act violate principles of 
procedural and substantive due process, it also eliminates the 
checks and balances constitutionally imposed between the execu-
tive and the judiciary. The Act replaces the buffer of the 
independent grand jury with the discretion of the prosecutor 
and leaves to the conscience of the prosecutor the protection 
of witness1 rights. The Seventh District Court's decision 
declaring the Act unconstitutional and dismissing the investi-
gation should be affirmed. 
-36-
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of Febr uary, 
1985. 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Emery Mining Corporation 
185 South state Street, Suite 
P. 0. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
700 
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I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, four true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENT EMERY MINING CORPORATION to the following on this 
day of February, 1985: 
David L. Wilkinson 
Attorney General 
Paul M. Warner 
Assistant Attorney General 
Robert N. Parish 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Donald B. Holbrook 
Elizabeth M. Haslam 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Place 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Stott, Colby & Maxfield 
Stephen B. Nebeker 
John A* Adams 
P.O. Box 3850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3850 
Attorney for Respondent 
Utah Power & Light Company 
Sumner J. Hatch, Esq. 
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72 East 400 South, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Max D. Wheeler, Esq. 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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ADDENDUM 
Appendix "A* 
U.S. Const, amend. 5: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the 
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual 
service time of War or public danger; nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private peoperty be taken for public use, without 
just compensation. 
Utah Const, art. I. § 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Utah Const, art. I, S 12: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, 
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be 
confronted by the witnesses against him, and to have 
compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in 
his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to 
appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused 
person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance 
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The 
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against 
her husband, nor husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Utah Const, art. V, S 1: 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah 
shall be divided into three distinct departments, the 
Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person 
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to 
one of these departments, shall exercise any function 
appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases 
herein expressly directed or permitted. 
Utah Const, art VI, S 22: 
Every bill shall be read by title three separate times 
in each house except in cases where two-thirds of the house 
where such bill is pending suspend this requirement. 
Except general appropriation bills and bills for the 
codification and general revision of laws, no bill shall be 
passed containing more than one subject, which shall be 
clearly expressed in its title. The vote upon the final 
passage of all bills shall be by yeas and nays and entered 
upon the respective journals of the house in which the vote 
occurs. No bill or joint resolution shall be passed except 
with the assent of the majority of all the members elected 
to each house of the Legislature. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-45-20 (1953) (the Orignial Act): 
Any matter involving the investigation of a crime, the 
existence of a crime, or any criminal conspiracy or 
activity the Attorney General, any district attorney or any 
county attorney shall have the right, upon application and 
approval of the district court for good cause shown, to 
subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance and testimony 
under oath before any certified court reporter, and require 
the production of books, papers, documents, records and 
other tangible items which constitute or may contain 
evidence which is or may be relevant or material to the 
investigation in the judgment of the Attorney General, 
District Attorney or County Attorney. 
The subpoena need not disclose the name or names of 
possible defendants and need only contain notification that 
the testimony of the witness is sought in aid of a criminal 
investigation and state the time and place of the examina-
tion, which may be conducted anywhere within the jurisdic-
tion of the attorney issuing the subpoena, and inform the 
party served that he is entitled to be represented by 
counsel. Witness fees and expenses shall be tendered and 
paid as in any civil action. 
In addition to the forgoing rights and powers to 
compel attendance and obtain evidence, the Attorney 
General, any District Attorney, or any County Attorney may 
make written application to any district court and the 
court may order that interrogation of any witness shall be 
before a closed court; that such proceedings shall be 
secret; and that the record of such testimony shall be keep 
secret unless and until the court for good cause otherwise 
orders. The court shall have the power to exclude from any 
investigative hearing or proceeding, any and all persons 
except the attorneys representing the state and members of 
their staffs, court reporter, and the attorney for the 
witness, 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-22-2 (1982) (the Amended Act): 
(1) In any matter involving the investigation of a 
crime, the existence of a crime or malfeasance in office or 
any criminal conspriacy or activity, the Attorney General 
or any county attorney shall have the right, upon applica-
tion and approval of the district court, for good cause 
shown, to conduct an investigation in which the prosecutor 
may subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance and testi-
mony under oath before any certified court reporter, and 
require the production papers, documents, recordings and 
any other items which constitute evidence or may be 
relevant to the investigation in the judgment of the 
Attorney General or county attorney. 
(2) The subpoena need not disclose the names of 
possible defendants and need only contain notification that 
the testimony of the witness is sought in aid of criminal 
investigations and state the time and place of the examina-
tion, which may be conducted anywhere within the jurisdic-
tion of the prosecutor using the subpoena, and inform the 
party served that he is entitled to be represented by 
counsel. Witness fees and expenses shall be paid as in a 
civil action. 
(3) The Attorney General or any county attorney may 
make written application to any district court and the 
court may order the interrogation of any witness shall be 
held in secret; that such proceedings shall be secret; and 
that the record of testimony be kept secret unless and 
until the court for good cause otherwise orders. The court 
may order excluded from any investigative hearings or 
proceedings any persons except the attorneys representing 
the state and members of their staffs, the court reporter 
and the attorney for the witness. 
Del, Code Ann. Title 29 S 2508 (1974): 
(a) The Attorney General or any assistant may 
administer oaths and affirmations to any person, including 
witnesses, at any time or in any place and may issue 
process to compel the attendance of persons, witnesses and 
evidence at the office of the Attorney General or at such 
other place as designated. 
(b) The Attorney General shall transmit to the 
Prothonotaries of the counties of this State a certified 
list giving the names and addresses of persons or witnesses 
subpoenaed under this section, the time occupied in 
attendance and the distance traveled by them respectively. 
The list shall be legal proof, and the same costs shall 
accrue and be paid in the same manner as is provided by law 
to be paid to witnesses for attendance at the courts of 
this State. 
APPENDIX "B 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR EMERY COUNTYt 
STATE OF UTAH 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
RELATIVE TO 
CONSTITUTIONALITY 
CS NO- 1 
On September 12, 1984, a hearing was held in this 
Court pursuant to Notice on Motions submitted by parties 
who were subject to subpoena under this Criminal Investiga-
tion proceeding. The Court ruled from the bench on most 
Motions and took under advisement the challenge to the 
constitutionality of the Act (77-22-1 et seq.), authorizing 
the investigative procedure being used as raised by several 
of the parties for the first time in their own behalf and by 
other parties on a Motion to reconsider. 
The Court previously considered the constitutional 
challenge to the Act at a hearing held on May 30, 1984, and 
the Court ruled at that time that the Court would give the 
Act the presumption of constitutionality provided that in 
Its application the State Prosecutors comply with the follow-
ing requirements: 
1. Witnesses subpoenaed pursuant to the 
Act must be informed whether or not they are 
targets of the investigation; 
IN THE MATTER OF 
) 
A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION ) 
2. Such witnesses must be informed of 
the nature of the matter under investigation 
and the scope of the investigation; 
3. Investigations conducted under the 
authority of the Act must be limited to 
criminal investigations within the parameters 
of the initial good cause affidavit. 
Since that ruling, the Court has had opportunity 
to see the manner in which the Act has been applied and is 
being applied and the way it can be used to violate the 
personal rights of the citizens of this state. 
For instance, the subpoena duces tecum served upon 
Emery Mining Company commands that Company to produce: 
"records which identify all officers, 
directors, consultants and employees 
(both union and non-union, professional 
and mining) of Emery Mining for the period 
1979 to the present. Such shall include, 
but not be limited to, names addresses, 
telephone numbers, dates of employment 
and employee numbers, if known.11 
Upon challenge, this Court ordered that general 
subpoena suppressed as being too broad in any investigation 
of any criminal activity. 
A previous subpoena issued by the Attorney General's 
Office attempted to get into Utah Power and Light Company's 
dealings in uranium mining, when in fact the original Good 
Cause Affidavit mentioned no indication of any criminal deal-
ings in this area. The State withdrew this subpoena when 
challenged in this court. 
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Another subpoena issued out of this proceeding 
was directed to a CPA firm and ordered the production of 
the following: 
HYou are commanded to bring with you any and all 
books, records, papers of any kind relating to 
Mike Thompson and Associates, Guardex, Alarmex, 
Vanguard, Mike Thompson, individually; Mike Ziemski, 
individually; Bruce Conklin, individually; Patsy 
Bowman, individually; and all other individuals 
and/or entities associated therewith." 
This subpoena was withdrawn by the State upon challenge in 
this Court. 
The deposition of L. Brent Fletcher,taken pursuant 
to subpoena issued under this investigative proceeding, did 
not comply with the requisites that this Court feels must be 
imposed to make the Act constituional in its application in 
that the witness never was informed that he was a target, 
nor as to the nature of the investigation and, because of 
the Secrecy Order, he had no way of knowing whether the matter 
being inquired into was within the perimeter of the good cause 
showing. He was allowed, and did have, his attorney present 
with him during these proceedings. 
Some criminal charges have already been filed in Salt 
Lake County based upon information obtained through this proceed-
ing, and a civil anti-trust case has been filed in Salt Lake 
County, also as a result of some of the information derived from 
this investigative proceeding. This investigative proceeding is 
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still open and being used for whatever purposes the State 
desires and solely within their discretion under the Act, 
without limitation as to when a criminal investigation 
becomes a prosecution or controlling the ultimate use of 
the findings for civil purposes. 
The Act has been abused and is subject to continued 
abuse under its broad terms and provisions that set no limit-
ations upon the State or any guidelines to the use of their 
subpoena power. The Court quite agrees with the Utah Supreme 
Court in its statement given in the case of In Re The Matter of 
Nelda Boyer, 636 P2d 1085, wherein the Court states as follows: 
"When State action impinges on fundamental rights, 
due process requires standards which clearly 
define the scope of permissable conduct so as 
to avoid unwarranted intrusion on those rights." 
This Court has, therefore, concluded that the Act 
is too vague and does not give proper protection to individual 
-citizens against violation of their consti tuional right of 
due process and protection against self-incrimination and 
allows for an absolute abuse of power without the benefit of 
judicial review or control once the general subpoena power 
1s granted and finds the Act is unconstitutional. 
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THEREFORE, the Court does hereby dismiss this 
Criminal Investigative Proceeding and strikes the Investigative 
Subpoena Power heretofore granted to the State by this Court. 
DATED this . ^ % ^ d a y of September, 1984. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct 
copies of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION RELATIVE TO 
CONSTITUTIONALITY, by depositing the same in the United 
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F. Robert Reeder, Esq. 
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DATED this 267r day of September, 1984. 
APPENDIX "C" 
Affidavit of Wayne L. Wickizer 
(Copies of the affidavit were provided to the Justices 
and their law clerks under separate cover so as not to 
violate a continuing secrecy Order.) 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
PAUL M. WARNER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Chief, Litigation Division 
STANLEY H. OLSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 533-7627 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF A SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION CS NO. 1 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO: Custodian of the Records 
Emery Mining Company 
c/o Francis M. Wikstrom 
185 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
532-1234 
You are hereby commanded to set aside all business 
and excuses and appear at the office of the Attorney General 
of the State of Utah, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
at the hour of 9:00 a.m., on Monday, the 25th day of June, 
1984, to give testimony in support of a criminal investigation. 
You are entitled to be represented by legal counsel. 
You are also commanded to bring with you any and all 
books, records, documents, accounts, or papers pertaining to: 
Records which identify all officers, directors/ 
consultants and employees (both union and non-union, professional 
and mining) of Emery Mining for the period 1979 to the present. 
Such shall include, but not be limited to, names, addresses, 
telephone numbers, dates of employment and employee numbers, 
if known. 
This Subpoena Duces Tecum is authorized by order 
of the District Court. Disobedience to this order is 
punishable by contempt of Court. 
Given under my hand this 1 (p'fk day of May, 1984. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
PAUL M. WARNER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Chief, Litigation Division 
By: .MA 1J f Q l ^ 
STANLEYJH. OLSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Litigation Division 
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APPENDIX "E" 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR EMERY COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER ON MOTION TO 
COMPEL PRODUCTION OF 
IN THE MATTER OF A ) DOCUMENTS 
) 
) 
) 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 
CS No. 1 
The Movants, Karl J. Stott, Norman Maxfield and 
Orrin T. Colby, Jr., have moved the Court for an order 
compelling the State of Utah to answer certain interrog-
atories and to produce certain documents, to supplement the 
record in aid of appeal in this case. This Court has 
previously declared the Statute that originated this proceed 
ing to be unconstitutional and has in effect dismissed the 
whole proceeding, and the State of Utah has filed its Notice 
of Appeal of that decision. 
When the Notice of Appeal is filed, the trial cour 
in general terms, loses jurisdiction to take further action 
the case except to take steps to see that the proper record 
goes to the Appellate Court in accordance with Rule 75(h). 
In the order requested, the applicant asks the Cou 
to order the Attorney General's Office to file documents in 
nature of the subpoenas that were issued by that office that 
are not part of the records of this Court, and would never 
become a record in this Court unless challenged by the party 
to whom it was directed. 
Since the matters asked for are not part of the 
record and may never become part of the record in this Court, 
and since the Court, under the Statutes in question, has no 
authority to require the filing or production of subpoenas 
issued by the Attorney General until contested, the Motion 
must be denied. 
The issuance, contents and matters covered, whether 
within the perimeter of the Investigative Affidavit, are 
entirely within the discretion of the prosecuting attorneys 
and are not subject to any judicial control or prior review. 
THEREFORE, this Court is of the opinion that it is 
without authority to order production of the subpoenas requested 
and is of the opinion that this is a further reason for declaring 
the Statute unconstitutional. 
DATED this day of December, 1984. 
S 
~ *"~ • 
B0~YD BUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE 
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